The 
Introduction
The regulation of parallel trade in the eld of pharmaceuticals has become a critical issue in the global trading system, as the welfare effects of parallel trade of pharmaceuticals are generally ambiguous.
1 For instance, Maskus and Ganslandt (2002) suggest in a non-technical article on parallel trade in the pharmaceutical industry that parallel trade freedom may increase prices in low-income countries and that small markets may end up not being served. We will show that this assertion is correct for speci c combinations of parallel trade cost and heterogeneity of countries in terms of market size. However, we will also show that parallel trade freedom still has a positive effect on global welfare in this case even though small markets remain unserved.
To the best of our knowledge, this speci c conclusion has not been drawn before in the prior theoretic literature on the welfare effects of parallel trade freedom. For instance, Malueg and Schwartz (1994) nd that global welfare under uniform pricing associated with parallel trade freedom will be lower than under international price discrimination if parallel trade freedom implies that some markets are dropped.
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The research-intensive pharmaceutical sector relies heavily on patents. 3 In particular, the value of a patent depends on the monopoly power afforded in terms of scope for price differentiation, 4 which depends on the existence of barriers to parallel trade. Put differently, the value of patent rights depends, to a certain extent, on "the scope for price discrimination within the area of exhaustion". 5 Furthermore, the narrower the area of exhaustion the greater is the scope for price differentiation, and thus the higher is ceteris paribus the value of a patent. Consequently, advocates of strong patent rights for new pharmaceutical products support a global policy of banning parallel trade. 6 For instance, representatives of the pharmaceutical industry argue that 1 See Grossman and Lai (2008) on p. 390ff, Maskus and Chen (2004) , and Danzon and Towes (2003) . See also Maskus (2001) and Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) on p. 1036ff. See Valletti and Szymanski (2006) for a comprehensive analysis of the impact of parallel trade freedom on global welfare in the presence of`generic' products. 2 See also Jelovac and Bordoy (2005) and Bar eld and Groombridge (1999) . 3 For instance, Mans eld (1986) in a ranking of industries' reliance on patent protection for innovation showed that the pharmaceutical sector is more than twice as dependent on patent protection as the next sector (chemicals). See also Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) on p. 457 and Harhoff et al. (2003) . 4 See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) on p. 1036. 5 See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) on p. 1037. 6 For instance, see Bar eld and Groombridge (1998) .
if parallel trade of pharmaceuticals were permitted it would cut pro ts in the pharmaceutical industry, and thus would reduce the incentives to invest in R&D for new drugs. 7 Nevertheless, policy makers in many developing countries not endowed with the technical and non-technical input factors required for innovation support an open regime of parallel trade. 8 In particular, they place a larger emphasis on the affordability of pharmaceuticals than on promoting R&D abroad, arguing that it is important to be able to purchase pharmaceuticals from the cheapest sources possible.
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The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing debate about the welfare effects of parallel trade. It is organized as follows. In section 2, we give an overview of the determinants of parallel trade. In section 3, we develop a double marginalization model with complete information which is played between a domestic monopolistic manufacturer of pharmaceuticals and a foreign exclusive distributor. In section 4, we investigate the impact of parallel trade freedom on the manufacturer's pro t, consumer surplus, and national welfare.
In section 5, we analyze the net effect of parallel trade freedom on global welfare for low, intermediate, and high trade costs and different levels of heterogeneity of the two countries where the manufacturer and the distributor are located. The paper concludes with some ideas for further research.
Legal and Economic Determinants of Parallel Trade
Parallel imports are also known as gray-market imports. 10 More speci cally, a parallel-imported product is a legitimately manufactured product under intellectual property protection that is rst placed into circulation in one country. Then, the product is imported to a second country without the consent of the owner of the intellectual property rights (henceforth, IPRs) that are attached to the product in the second country.
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The ability of an owner of IPRs to exclude parallel trade stems from the importing country's 7 See Danzon (1998) . However, see also Grossman and Lai (2008) Chard and Mellor (1989) and Danzon (1998) . See also Maskus (2001) Put differently, countries can freely decide on whether to allow or ban parallel trade.
There are several economic theories on the causes of parallel trade.
First, in many circumstances ef cient international distribution of goods and services requires multinational enterprises that typically build markets through exclusive territorial dealership rights, in order to vertically control the operations of their of cial licensees. Nevertheless, in foreign markets it may be dif cult to enforce private contractual provisions prohibiting sales outside the authorized distribution chain, so that parallel trade may occur. 16 Second, in some industries such as the pharmaceutical industry national governments intervene in private markets by regulating prices in order to achieve particular social objectives, i.e. to make medicines affordable for low-income consumers and to limit public health budgets. As these government interventions result in signi cant international price differences there is a potential for arbitrage between markets: parallel importing rms purchase a certain product in more regulated (lower-price) markets and re-sell the product in less regulated (higher-price) markets. 17 For instance, Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) take into account international differences between the regulatory regimes in the pharmaceuticals area. They explore the effect of the entry of parallel traders on the prices of pharmaceutical producers in Sweden from 1994 to 1999. Prior to Sweden's entry into the European Union on 1 January 1995 parallel trade of pharmaceuticals was prohibited. However, after its entry Sweden had to adopt the EU-wide principle of exhaustion of patent distribution rights and thus permitted parallel trade. Therefore, the Swedish market provides a natural example for testing and estimating the effect of the exogenous shock to the patented pharmaceutical market, due the introduction of parallel trade. Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) nd that the prices of pharmaceutical products subject to competition from parallel trade fell relative to other pharmaceutical products over the period 1994-1999. They conclude that parallel trade signi cantly reduces prices, by 12-19 per cent, relative to other pharmaceutical products not subject to competition from parallel trade.
Arguably, parallel trade represents a signi cant form of competition in Sweden.
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A third determinant for parallel trade is that parallel importing rms have the incentive to free ride on investments in marketing as well as on the before-and after-sales services of of cial licensees and authorized distributors. We consider a simple model with two countries A and B and two rms. In Country A there is a monopolistic manufacturer, henceforth m. In Country B there is a single authorized independent rm, henceforth r, which is responsible for the distribution and retail of the manufacturer's product. The manufacturer holds a patent on his product in both countries. We assume that ef cient international distribution of the product requires the manufacturer to build a market in Country B through exclusive territorial dealership rights. For instance, suppose that the exclusive distributor in Country B has already established costly distribution channels. 20 Furthermore, we assume that the countries differ in market size and in price elasticity of demand.
The strategies available to the manufacturer and the distributor are the different prices they might charge. 21 Demand for the product in Country A is
with > 1. p A denotes the price in Country A. Let denote the pro t of the manufacturer and the pro t of the distributor, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that marginal costs of production c are equal to zero in both countries. 22 Demand for the product in Country B is
is a measure for the homogeneity of the two countries. If ! 1, the two countries are virtually homogenous. Put differently, the higher the more heterogeneous are the two countries in terms of markets size. As > 1 the price elasticity of demand in Country A is lower than the price elasticity of demand in Country B. Thus, standard economic theory tells us that, in the absence of parallel trade, the single manufacturer engages in third-degree price discrimination and sets a price in Country A that exceeds the price in Country B. We assume that there is an exclusive distributor in Country B that is of cially approved by the authorities in Country A for re-importing the quantities of the product he can buy from the monopolistic manufacturer.
Hence the distributor sells to consumers in Country B at rst, but may also engage in parallel trade from Country B to Country A. We also assume that arbitrage by individual consumers between B and A is legally prohibited. The marginal costs of engaging in parallel trade are denoted by t. 22 This is a common assumption in models that deal with the strategic decisions of pharmaceutical companies, as the marginal cost of production are negligibly small compared to the cost of research and development. For instance, see Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) on p. 1040.
For instance, the costs of re-packaging and re-labeling are incurred by the parallel-importing distributor as well as other parallel trade-speci c transaction costs such as import duties on parallel trade. 23 Furthermore, we assume that the parallel import product is a perfect substitute for the product sold by the original producer in Country A.
Before we proceed to the analysis of the double marginalization game in which the exclusive distributor in Country B may engage in parallel trade we will rst analyze the case that the manufacturer of the patented product is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade as a benchmark.
Double Marginalization Game without Parallel Trade
Suppose that the manufacturer can itself become involved in the retail of the product in Country
A, but sells the product in Country B through an exclusive distributor. Furthermore, we assume that the distributor in Country B has a monopoly on the retailing business in Country B. We make the simplifying assumption that retailing in Country B does not involve any cost, except for the cost incurred by the distributor in buying the units of the product from the manufacturing rm.
In the rst stage, the manufacturing rm sets a wholesale price p w B for the distributor, and the distributor sets a price p B for the retail trade in Country B in the second stage. We will rst assume that the manufacturer is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade of the product from Country B, i.e. he is awarded an explicit right of importation of the product. Arbitrage by individual consumers between the two countries is legally prohibited.
Using backward induction we obtain the following quantities, prices and pro ts:
23 See Maskus and Chen (2004) So far, we have assumed that the manufacturer is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade. In the following section, we relax this assumption and allow for parallel trade, in order to explore the important strategic decision faced by the manufacturer as to at which wholesale price the product is sold to the distributor in Country B, anticipating that part of the quantities sold can be re-imported.
Double Marginalization Game with Parallel Trade
Suppose that the manufacturer cannot contractually limit or even prohibit parallel trade. The timing of the game is as follows:
In the rst stage, the manufacturing rm chooses the wholesale price p In the second stage, the distributor chooses the retail price p B , p B 2 [0; 1), in Country B.
In the third stage, the manufacturer m and the exclusive distributor r simultaneously choose the price at which they sell the product in Country A in a Bertrand model of duopoly, e.g. p stage and working backwards to the rst stage, in order to look for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. In particular, we will show that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 3.1 Parallel trade will never occur in any sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in a double marginalization game with complete information and Bertrand price competition in the last stage.
Backward Induction
We start with the last stage where the manufacturer and the distributor play a Bertrand game 24 and simultaneously choose prices for the product in Country A.
Prices and demand served must be consistent with the following rules:
The manufacturer has xed cost of zero and marginal cost of zero. The distributor also has xed cost of zero. However, the distributor treats the sum of the wholesale price p First, note that a rm would never charge a price that is lower than its marginal cost. In this case, the rm could increase its pro ts by simply reducing the quantities produced. On the one hand, the manufacturer could supply a positive quantity of the product as long as the price is non-negative, as his marginal costs are zero. On the other hand, the distributor would not charge a price smaller than his marginal cost p w B + t. Hence, the manufacturer can monopolize the market in Country A and steal all of the customers from the parallel importing distributor by setting a price that is in nitesimally smaller than the marginal cost of the distributor. Put differently, the manufacturer will always set a price p Note that this result holds for any non-negative p Nevertheless, in the second stage, the distributor anticipates that he will be driven out of the market in Country A in the third stage. Hence the maximization problem of the distributor is identical to the maximization problem we have already discussed in the previous section.
Working backwards to the rst stage, the maximization problem of the manufacturer is to maximize the total pro t generated in Country A and Country B, subject to the constraint stated in p Adopting the Kuhn-Tucker Method, the maximization problem has the following format: Let us write the classical type of the Lagrangian function, L, as follows
We obtain the following rst-order conditions: (2 + 1)
Note that the optimal price the manufacturer sets in Country A always exceeds the optimal wholesale price the manufacturer charges the distributor in Country B as t > 0. More speci -
Furthermore, we can see that the optimal wholesale price decreases if t increases, and that the optimal price the manufacturer sets in Country A increases if t increases, respectively. Put differently, the higher the parallel trade cost t for a given and thus the less pro 
By comparing these results with the results from the previous section (see Table 1 ), we nd that p m A is equal to the monopoly price in a double marginalization game in which parallel trade is prohibited, and p w B is equal to the pro t-maximizing wholesale price in a double marginalization game in which parallel trade is prohibited, respectively. Intuitively, if the two countries are 26 See Appendix 1 for the proof that for the non-negativity restriction for p w B to be satis ed it is suf cient that the non-negativity restriction for 3 is satis ed.
virtually homogeneous ( ! 1) and the parallel trade costs are so high that t > t, the distributor will not be willing to engage in parallel trade. Put differently, if t > t, the outcome of the double marginalization game in which parallel trade is permitted is equal to the outcome of the double marginalization game in which the manufacturer is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade. Country B will not be served
Country B will not be served
Country B will not be served Henceforth, we will refer to this threshold as the lower bound for the trade cost, that is t= a 2b 5 2
. Intuitively, if trade costs are very low, i.e t < t, potential competition from parallel trade is so erce that the manufacturer has to charge such a high wholesale price in Country B in order to deter parallel trade that the distribution of the good in Country B becomes unpro table.
In this case, the market in Country B will not be served.
To summarize, we have to consider three different scenarios. First, parallel trade costs are so high -more speci cally t > t -that parallel trade is not a worthwhile activity for the distributor and thus a non-credible threat. In other words, for very high trade costs, the equilibrium outcome will be the same no matter whether or not the manufacturer is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade. More speci cally, parallel trade does not have any impact on pro ts, consumer surplus as well as national and global welfare. However, the analysis of the second scenario with trade costs at an intermediate level -more speci cally t t t -is not trivial. As we will see in the following, for intermediate trade costs, the manufacturer will strategically set prices in order to deter parallel trade under a regime of international exhaustion of IPRs. However, the wholesale price will be suf ciently low so that the distribution of the product in Country B is still a worthwhile activity. In the third scenario with very low trade costs -more speci cally t <t -the manufacturer will charge such a high wholesale price in Country B, in order to deter parallel trade under a regime of international exhaustion of IPRs that the market in Country B ends up not being served.
In the following sections, we will analyze the impact of parallel trade freedom on the pro t of the manufacturer and on global welfare for intermediate and low trade costs, respectively.
Effect of Parallel Trade Freedom on the Pro t of the Manufacturer
Appendix 2 shows that the following proposition holds. The intuition behind this result is the following. First, the equilibrium pro t of the manufacturer will be the same no matter whether or not the manufacturer is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade if trade cost are very high. In this case, parallel trade is not a credible threat and does not erode the manufacturer's ability to discriminate prices which is the rst-best outcome from the manufacturer's perspective. If, however, trade costs are intermediate or low, parallel trade is a credible threat and the manufacturer strategically sets prices in order to deter it. Consequently, a credible threat of parallel trade erodes the manufacturer's ability to discriminate prices and thus reduces his pro t as compared to a situation where he is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade.
Nevertheless, an important point in favor of banning parallel trade is the following. By the time the manufacturer chooses to invest in R&D for a new product, he will be more willing to do so, anticipating that he will be able to raise more money from the development of a new product.
In other words, under the assumption that the R&D investment leads with certainty to the development of a new product, the maximum amount that the manufacturer is willing to invest in R&D for the product is just the pro t that he can generate. As the pro t of the manufacturer if he is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade is higher than his pro t under parallel trade freedom, the incentive of the manufacturer to invest in R&D -for low and intermediate trade costs -is higher if he can prevent parallel trade.
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To summarize, Proposition 4.1 suggests that the manufacturer can never be better off under 27 See also Valletti and Szymanski (2006) 
Pro t of the Distributor
If the manufacturer is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade, the pro t of the distributor is the same for high, intermediate and low trade costs and given by
Note that the distributor generates the same pro t if parallel trade is permitted but trade costs are high, h .
If, however, trade costs are intermediate and parallel trade is permitted, the distributor will make a pro t according to
Parallel trade freedom is detrimental to the distributor in this case as i = i < 0.
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The intuition behind this result is the following. If the threat of parallel trade is credible, the manufacturer will charge a higher wholesale price in Country B -as compared to the wholesale price under a regime in which parallel trade is prohibited -in order to deter parallel trade.
28 To see that this is true note that i has its unique maximum at the lower bound for t, t . Furthermore, i is negative at t as a 2 36b < 0. Consequently, i is also negative for any other value of the parameter t.
Consequently, the distributor will sell less at a higher price resulting in a lower pro t under a regime of parallel trade freedom.
Finally, recall that neither the distribution of the good in Country B nor parallel trade is a worthwhile business activity if trade costs are low as the manufacturer strategically charges a prohibitively high wholesale price in Country B in order to deter parallel trade. Hence, the pro t of the distributor for low trade costs is equal to zero if parallel trade is permitted.
Consumer Surplus in Country A
We obtain the consumer surplus in Country A if the manufacturer has the right to prevent parallel trade as follows: 
Consumer Surplus in Country B
We obtain the consumer surplus in Country B if the manufacturer is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade as follows: 
Effect of Parallel Trade Freedom on Global Welfare
We derive the net effect of parallel trade freedom on global welfare by subtracting global welfare if the manufacturer has the right to prevent parallel trade from global welfare if parallel trade is permitted. The intuition behind this is the following. If this difference is negative, parallel trade is detrimental to global welfare and thus the manufacturer should be awarded the right to prevent parallel trade. If, however, this difference is positive, it would indicate that global welfare is higher if parallel trade is permitted.
Net Effect of Parallel Trade Freedom on Global Welfare if Trade Costs are High
We already know from the analysis in the previous sections that the outcome of the double In this section, we will show that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 5.1 Parallel trade freedom increases global welfare if trade costs are intermediate and 5=2.
Let the net effect of parallel trade freedom on global welfare be denoted by W i if trade costs are at an intermediate level. We obtain W i as follows:
Note that W i is a quadratic function of t. If W i is positive, parallel trade freedom has a positive effect on global welfare. If, however, it is negative, parallel trade freedom is detrimental to global welfare. First, note that W i = 0 at the upper bound for t, t = a 2b
( 1). Hence, in order to show that W i and thus the effect of parallel trade freedom on global welfare is positive it is suf cient to show that W i is a monotonically decreasing function of t for t t t. Let us rst nd out whether W i has a unique maximum. From @ W i @t = 5a 36 2bt 9 a 18 = 0 follows:
is the unique maximum as
is the unique maximum, W i decreases in t for any t > t , W i decreases in t. Furthermore, taking into account that
( 1), it follows that
. In the following, we consider for which values of the parameter
is smaller than or equal to the lower bound t . It is straightforward to see that t , we cannot apply the same logic as in the previous section in order to answer the question as to whether W i is positive or negative. Note that -for < would be negative. However, as t is positive we set the lower bound for t equal to zero in this case. Furthermore, note that -for < . Hence, the question arises as to whether W i is positive or negative at the lower bound for t. For instance, if we can show that W i is positive at t = 0 this would imply that W i is also positive between the lower bound and the upper bound taking into account that W i = 0 at the upper bound for t. In the following we will
show that W i is positive at t = 0 if In this section, we will show that the following proposition holds. .
By setting t = 0 in (2) we obtain
Note that W i is greater than or equal to zero if ].
We already know from the previous section that W i = 0 at the upper bound
( 1).
However, by looking at (2), it becomes apparent that W i has another null at t = a 2b 7 2 2 :
Note that -in contrast to the previous sections -t is positive in this case as < 7=4. However, the following example illustrates that Proposition 5.3 holds. 29 For instance, we can see that 7 11 + 4 2 = 0 if = . Figure 1 shows that W i has one null at t = 25 and the other null at t = 62:5 which is also the upper bound. Furthermore, W i has its unique maximum at t , consumers in Country A will bene t less from parallel trade freedom. In this case, the net effect of parallel trade freedom on global welfare will be negative if trade costs are at an intermediate level.
Net Effect of Parallel Trade on Global Welfare if Trade Costs are Low
In this section, we shall show that the following proposition holds. ).
If trade costs are low, t > t, the effect of parallel trade freedom on global welfare is given by:
Note that W l is a quadratic function of t. Moreover, recall that -as t is positive -must be greater than 
Conclusion
Our model suggests that parallel trade in a double marginalization game with complete information will never occur in the sub-game perfect equilibrium, as it is always bene cial for the manufacturer to monopolize the market in Country A. However, the question arises as to how the manufacturer strategically chooses prices in order to prevent the occurrence of parallel trade.
As we have shown, this depends on the level of the heterogeneity of the two countries in terms of market size -as measured by -and the trade costs t for given values for a and b. , parallel trade freedom can have negative welfare properties [Proposition 5.3] . In this case, the negative effect of parallel trade freedom on the manufacturer, the distributor as well as on the consumers in Country B more than outweighs the positive effect of parallel trade freedom on the consumers in Country A.
As a rst idea for further research, we suggest a more elaborate theoretical and empirical analysis of the parameter t which is of signi cant importance for the results of our model. For instance, suppose that t is very low. In this case, Country B is likely to end up not being served at all under parallel trade freedom. As already mentioned, costs of re-packaging and relabeling are incurred by the parallel-importing distributor as well as other parallel trade-speci c transaction costs such as import duties on parallel trade. One may argue that the parameter t can to some extent be in uenced by the manufacturer, i.e. through special labeling, language, warnings etc. that make re-packaging and re-labeling more expensive for the parallel-importing distributor. 33 Intuitively, on the one hand, the manufacturer may prefer to make parallel trade as costly as possible, in order to prevent parallel trade. Consider again the case of very low parallel trade costs where Country B ends up not being served. In this case, it may be bene cial for the manufacturer to increase t so that he can sell his product in Country B even under parallel trade freedom. On the other hand, to increase t through special labeling, language and warnings may also be costly for the manufacturer so that a trade-off arises between the costs of increasing t and the bene t from preventing parallel trade.
As a second idea for further research, we suggest analyzing the strategic behavior of foreign governments to protect consumers in their country from excessive pricing, i.e. through price caps or compulsory licensing. 33 For instance, see Maskus and Ganslandt (2002) 12b :
Note that i is a quadratic function of t. We will elaborate in the following upon this important However, let us now turn to the question as to whether the same reasoning applies to the case with low trade costs in the following.
Effect of Parallel Trade Freedom on the Manufacturer's Pro t for Low Trade Costs
In this section, we consider the case of very low trade costs, t <t. Recall that trade costs are positive. Hence, we can see from t <t= However, for low trade cost, the equilibrium pro t of the manufacturer if he is awarded the right to prevent parallel trade is given by
